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Abstract 
 
We analyze in this paper the impact of different policies on the investment of the 
families in the education of their children. Families make decisions on the level of 
human capital of their offsprings regarding the future income that this capital entails 
(under the assumption that higher education levels yield higher expected income). 
The families' optimal investment in education depends on their preferences 
(summarized by their time discount and risk aversion parameters) and their 
circumstances (initial wealth, parents' education, and children' natural abilities). 
The public authority designs a balanced tax/subsidy scheme in order to maximize 
aggregate welfare. We compare the case of a purely utilitarian planner with one 
that cares about the equality of opportunity. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
This paper deals with the design of an equality of opportunity policy when agents' 
outcomes are random variables that depend on their previous choice of effort. That 
choice of effort is a function of the agents' characteristics and the policy variables. 
We aim at determining the implications of the policy that leads to equality of 
opportunity, relative to the standard maximization of aggregate welfare. In order to 
fix ideas we focus on the case in which agents are families who decide on the 
education of their children. 
We consider a society made of a finite number of heterogeneous agents (families) 
who make decisions today on how much to invest in the education of their children, 
bearing in mind that such an investment is positively correlated to the children's 
income tomorrow.3 Investment today is the effort decision whereas the human 
capital achieved by children tomorrow is the outcome. We assume, according to 
the empirical evidence, that labour income is positively related to the level of 
studies (quantity and quality of the human capital accumulated), so that investing in 
education amounts to determine the children's future expected income (see Card 
(1999)). The action of the public authority consists of affecting today's decisions of 
families via taxes and subsidies. 
We assume that parents are altruistic with respect to their offsprings and, 
therefore, they are ready to invest in education in order to provide them with the 
best possible chances in life, given their circumstances. The model only considers 
the family's aggregate investment in education, without paying attention to the 
composition of that expenditure. Note, however, that investment in education can 
take a number of alternative forms with different implications: providing studies that 
go beyond compulsory education (e.g. university degrees), making expenses that 
are complementary to public schooling (extra-curricular activities, choice of private 
schools, etc.), or investment in early education, say.4 Yet, the analysis of those 
implications is beyond the scope of this paper. 
Following the equality of opportunity approach [eg. Roemer (1993, 1998)], we 
assume that individual outcomes (future income in our case) can be regarded as 
the result of two different effects: effort and opportunity (see also Roemer et al 
(2003), Ruiz Castillo (2003) and Villar (2005)). Effort has to do with responsibility 
(that here refers to the investment in the children's human capital) whereas 
opportunity alludes to the agents' external circumstances (that here translates into 
                                                 
3 Needless to say, in real life some of those decisions involve not only the parents and the students 
but also the schools (on this interplay see the model by de Fraja et al. (2008)). 
4 There is evidence on the relevance of the education in early stages (Heckman (2006)) because, at 
that time, children not only acquire some basic abilities (cognitivie skills) but also conform their 
attitudes (non-cognitive skills). The interplay between cognitive and non-congnitive skills explains 
much of the future achievements of the young (Heckman & Rubinstein (2001), Carneiro et al 
(2003), Heckman (2007)). 
 
 
the parents' wealth and education and the children's natural abilities). The bottom 
line of this approach is that a fair society should compensate agents for differences 
in opportunity but not for those differences derived from autonomous decisions. 
Therefore, the public policy is oriented to the equalization of agents' circumstances 
by altering the initial wealth trying to help the children of the less favoured families. 
Roemer (2006) presents a model in this vein focussing on the political equilibrium 
in which families vote for the different policies; Hanushek et al. (2003) analyze the 
redistribution through education with respect to other policies. 
Contrary to the usual equality of opportunity models, effort is here an explicit 
decision variable and not a residual that explains the different achievements. 
Moreover, our set up is non-deterministic. That is, the children's future income is a 
random variable (a function of education, ability and luck, so to speak). We focus 
on the case of perfect information: the public authority observes the families's effort 
and applies a policy that maximizes social welfare under the equality of opportunity 
constraint.5 
  
The work is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and explains the 
behaviour of both the families and the public authority in a conventional setting. 
Each family is characterized by a two-period separable utility function, the family 
background (initial wealth and education of the parents), and the child's natural 
ability. In order to simplify the analysis, we shall assume most of the time that 
agents' utilities are equal, except for a "concern parameter" (a sort of time discount 
factor that measures the substitutability between today's disposable wealth and 
tomorrow's income of the children) and the risk aversion coefficient. Therefore, 
families will differ in their "concern" for the future, their risk attitudes, their initial 
wealth and cultural background, and their children's natural abilities. We first 
determine the optimal investment of the families, for a given tax subsidy scheme. 
The equilibrium level of the family's investment increases with the concern 
parameter and with the subsidy (as it reduces the opportunity cost of education). 
The relationship between effort and natural abilities, on the one hand, and effort 
and risk aversion, on the other hand, turn out to depend on whether the coefficient 
of risk aversion is greater or smaller than unity. Once individual decisions have 
been characterized, we analyze the behaviour of a utilitarian planner. 
Section 3 deals with the optimal policy from an equality of opportunity viewpoint 
and relates these results to those under the utilitarian regime. To do so we 
generate a partition of the population in different types, according to the agents' 
initial wealth, cultural background, and natural abilities. Then we propose an index 
that allows to compare degrees of investment effort across types. The equality of 
opportunity policy aims at equalizing the expected income of those children whose 
families exerted a comparable degree of effort. 
Our results show that both the utilitarian and the equality of opportunity policies 
                                                 
5 See Lefranc et al (2007) for a model with random outcomes and non-observable effort. A dynamic 
version of this setting, with incomplete information is analyzed in Calo-Blanco (2008). 
 
 
coincide in that they imply transfers from rich to poor people. Similarly, the more 
concerned the parents for the future of their children, the larger the subsidy. Those 
policies differ in the treatment of productivity. The utilitarian policy gives more 
subsidies to those who are more productive (as they contribute more to the 
aggregate welfare), whereas the equality of opportunity policy implies transferring 
wealth to those who have less natural ability, worse cultural background, and to 
those who exert a higher relative effort. 
A few final comments are gathered in section 4. 
 
2.  The basic model 
 
Consider a society consisting of a public authority (also referred to as `the social 
planner') and a set of agents (families), in a two-period scenario. Families make 
decisions in the first period concerning the education of their children, as a function 
of their preferences, the parental background (human capital previously 
accumulated and wealth), and the children's abilities. Children land on the second 
period with a level human capital that results from their parents' decisions and 
determines their expected earnings. The planner may alter the initial distribution of 
wealth by taxing and subsidizing the families, under the restriction of aggregate 
budget balance. 
 
2.1. The family's decision 
 
Our society consists of a set  M  1, . . . ,m, . . . ,M   of families. To make things 
simpler we assume that each family is made exactly of the parents and one child. 
Families are heterogeneous concerning their preferences and their external 
circumstances, that we associate with their cultural background (human capital 
previously accumulated), denoted by  Hm  , and their wealth, denoted by  wm ∈ R  
, for all  m ∈ M.   The wealth of family  m   can be modified by the presence of a 
tax/subsidy scheme that results in an amount  m ∈ R   ( m   is the subsidy that the 
planner gives to agent  m  , when positive, or the wealth tax when negative). 
Each family makes a decision in the first period concerning the investment in the 
education of the child. We assume that the amount invested by family  m,   denoted 
by  em ,   is a point in the interval  eo , em ,   where  eo   corresponds to the basic 
cost of the public compulsory education (that we assume to be equal for all agents, 
for the sake of simplicity) and we let  em ≥ wm /2.  6 The disposable wealth of family  
m   with an investment  em ,   is thus given by:  
                                                 
6 This upper bound is established in order to ensure the consistency with the formulation below. 
 
 
wmD  wm  m − em  
 
The uncertain future is described by a set of  S   states of nature, with probabilities  
1 ,    2 ,    . . . ,    S .   The investment in education of the parents results in a given 
level of human capital for the child in the second period, denoted by  hm   (that we 
assume to be independent on the state of nature, for the sake of simplicity). The 
technology of production of human capital can be described by a function: 
hm  m pHm q  em  
where  Hm   is the parental cultural background (human capital formerly 
accumulated), and  m   is a coefficient that reflects the child's natural ability. The 
coefficients  p   and  q   control the impact of those variables on the production of 
human capital. We assume that all first derivatives are positive. 
The income that the child of family  m   will obtain in state  s,    yms ,   is a linear 
function of the human capital:  yms  shm ,   where  s   is a coefficient that 
describes how human capital is transformed into income depending on the state of 
nature. Therefore, we can write:  
yms  ms em  
In this way we make it explicit the dependence of the child's future income on the 
decision of the families concerning the private investment in education (with  
ms : sm pHm q   for  s  1,2, . . . ,S  . It is therefore assumed that the human 
capital achieved by the child will be proportional to the investment in education, 
with a proportionality coefficient that depends on the child's natural ability, the 
parental cultural background, and the state of nature.7 
The expected labour income of the child of family  m   associated with an 
educational investment  em   is thus given by: 
Eym em   ∑
s1
S
sms em 
mem
 
where  
m  ∑s1S sms   denotes the child's average productivity (the expected 
return associated with one unit of investment). We assume that  ms  1,   for all  s,   
that is, investing in education always yields non-negative returns. 
 
                                                 
7 One may also consider the effect of the level of public expenditure in education, Here we implicitly 
assume that this variable is fixed during the analysis, so that it can be omitted from the production 
function of human capital. 
 
 
Family  m   derives utility from today's net wealth and from the child's future 
income, according to the following separable utility function: 
Um m ,em   um wmD   m∑
s1
S
sum yms em 
 
where  um ,   is assumed to be monotone, differentiable and concave. The 
parameter  m ∈ 0,1  denotes the family's concern about the future income of the 
child. This is a sort of time discount factor that summarizes the relationship 
between today's income of the family and tomorrow's expected income of the child. 
The family decides the optimal investment in education as a solution to the 
following program: 
 
Maxem um wm  m − em   m ∑s1S sum ms em 
s. t. : em ∈ e0 , em 
 
The first order conditions of this program, assuming interior solutions, are given by: 
 
∂um
∂wm  m − em   m ∑s1
S
sms ∂um∂ms em  , ∀ m ∈ M 1
 
 
Those conditions establish, not surprisingly, that each family's marginal utility in the 
first period equals the expected marginal utility in the second period.  The optimal 
choice of effort (investment) is, therefore, dependent on the family's characteristics 
(wealth, human capital of the parents, marginal utility, concern parameter, and 
average productivity of the child) and the tax/subsidy policy. The educational 
investment clearly increases with the concern parameter: an increase in  m   
requires an increase in investment so that the left hand side levels the higher r.h.s. 
Also note that optimal investment increases with the family's wealth and the 
subsidy. Therefore, an increase in the subsidy leads to a higher education. The 
reason is that the marginal utility in the first period will decrease as a result of the 
higher subsidy (due to the concavity of the utility function), so that the investment in 
education should increase in response. The intuition is that the subsidy reduces 
the opportunity cost of the investment. 
The relationship between optimal investment and the child's productivity is more 
complex and can be linked to the degree of concavity of the utility function (that is 
measured by the elasticity of the marginal utility). The following result summarizes 
that relation: 
 
• Proposition 1.-  The investment in education increases (resp. 
decreases) with the productivity coefficient  ms   if and only if  ms  1   
(resp.  ms  1  ), where  ms   is the elasticity of the marginal utility of 
income in state  s  . 
Proof.- 
Let us consider the derivative of the r.h.s. of the equilibrium condition  1  with 
respect to a change in the productivity coefficients: 
 
∂ msms ∂um∂ms em
∂ms  ms
∂um
∂ms em   msm
s ∂2um
∂ms em 2
em
 
 
Observe now that, as  ms em   is the income of agent  m   in state  s,   the first term 
of the r.h.s of this equality is positive (by monotonicity) whereas the second one is 
negative (by concavity). Therefore, the derivative turns out to be positive if and only 
if, 
ms ∂um∂ms em  msm
s ∂2um
∂ms em 2
em  0
 
that is, if and only if 
∂um
∂ms em  −
∂2um
∂ms em 2
ms em
 
or, put differently, 
1  − um
′′
um′
ms em  ms
 
 
Therefore, when  ms  1   an increase in the productivity coefficient will induce an 
increase in the r.h.s of the equilibrium condition  1.   That implies, in order to keep 
the equality, an increase of the marginal utility in the l.h.s. of  1,   which requires 
an increase of the investment. 
A similar reasoning applies for  ms  1.     Q.e.d.  
 
This result simply says that when the marginal utility is inelastic, higher productivity 
is associated with higher investment in education. And viceversa: when the 
marginal utility changes more than proportionally with respect to the income, then 
higher productivity translates into a smaller investment in education. When  ms  1   
the investment turns out to be independent on the productivity. 
From this result we obtain the following: 
 Corollary When the marginal utility is elastic,  ms  1,   higher parental cultural 
background or higher natural ability imply lower family investment in education. 
The interpretation of this corollary is very simple: when  ms  1   parental 
background and the child's natural ability are substitutes of the family's investment 
in education. 
 
 
2.2. Concern and risk aversion 
 
The results above suggest that the concern parameter and the degree of concavity 
of the utility function can be singularized as the most relevant traits of the families' 
preferences, in order to explain their investment effort. We therefore develop the 
ensuing analysis focussing on utilities that depend explicitly on those two 
parameters. Bearing in mind that the elasticity of marginal utility corresponds to the 
Arrow-Pratt coefficient of relative risk aversion, we assume that  um   is drawn from 
the following family of functions:  
ux  x 1−a − 11 − a , a  0  
where  a   is the coefficient of relative risk aversion (constant for all  x  . This 
coefficient controls the curvature of the function (degree of concavity), from straight 
lines (for  a  0   to right angles (for  a  .   The case  a  1   boils down to the 
usual logarithmic utilities:  ux  lnx.   
Within this setting agents' preferences are characterized by two different 
parameters, the concern parameter and the coefficient of risk aversion (that we 
assume to be independent). The optimal investment of family  m   is obtained from 
the maximization of the following function: 
 
Um m ,em   wm  m − em 
1−am − 1
1 − am  m∑s1
S
s m
s 1−amem1−am − 1
1 − am
 
 
The first order conditions, when solutions are interior, are given by:8  
em∗  bm
1/am
1  bm1/am
wm  m  2
 
where  bm  m ∑s1S sms 1−am   represents the expected level of human capital 
associated with one unit of investment, weighted by agent  m  's risk aversion and 
concern. This term is a summary of the family's features: parental background, 
                                                 
8 We assume implicitly that  m  wm  e0 ,   for all  m.  Needless to say,  em∗  e0   when  
em∗  bm
1/am
1bm1/am
wm  m   e0 ,   and  em∗  em   when  em
∗  bm1/am
1bm1/am
wm  m   em .   
 
 
concern, risk aversion and the child's natural ability. Note that productivity is 
considered an expression of the child's natural ability and the family background; it 
is therefore part of her "external circumstances". Concern and risk aversion, on the 
contrary, can be regarded as expressions of the family's responsibility (we return 
on this later on). 
It is easy to check that optimal investment in education is an increasing function of 
the concern parameter, the initial wealth, and the subsidy. It increases or 
decreases with the productivity coefficients depending on whether  am   is smaller 
or greater than one (Proposition 1 and its corollary). Trivially,  am  1   implies  
bm1/am  m   and investment turns out to be independent on the child's productivity. 
The relation between optimal investment and the coefficient of risk aversion is 
more complex and depends on whether  bm   is smaller or greater than unity. We 
can establish the following on this respect: 
 Proposition The optimal investment is an increasing function of the coefficient of 
risk aversion provided  am  1.   
Proof.- 
We have to check the sign of the derivative of  em∗   with respect to  am :  
 
∂em∗
∂am 
∂
∂am
bm1/a
1  bm1/a
wm  m 
 
 
Consider first the following: 
∂b1/am
∂am 
∂
∂a m∑
s1
S
sms 1−am
1/am
 bm1/am −1
am2
lnbm  m ∑s1
S sms 1−am−1 lnms
bm
1
am
 − bm
1/am
am2
lnbm − ambm m∑s1
S
sms 1−am ln 1ms
 
The sign of this expression depends on whether  bm   is smaller or greater than 
one. Clearly,  ∂b1/am /∂am  0  whenever  bm ≤ 1.   
If we let   : −
1
am2
lnbm − ambm m ∑s1S sms 1−am ln 1ms   and assume that  bm ≤ 1,   
we would have:  
∂em∗
∂am 
b1/amwm  m 1  b1/am − b1/amwm  m b1/am
1  b1/am 2
 b
1/amwm  m 
1  b1/am 2
 0
 
 
Therefore,  ∂em∗ /∂am  0   provided  bm ≤ 1.   
Finally, observe that  am  1   is a sufficient condition for  bm ≤ 1.     Q.e.d. 
 
Proposition 2 establishes that an increase in the parameter of risk aversion induces 
a higher investment in education when the marginal utility is elastic (in this case an 
increase in  am   makes it "cheaper", in utility terms, investing in education). The 
impact of the increase is controlled by the concern coefficient  m .   
 
The equilibrium disposable wealth of agent  m   in the first period is:  
wm
D  1
1  bm1/am
wm  m  3
 
(we shall use this expression subsequently to analyze the impact of the different 
policies). 
 
 
2.3.  The standard social choice problem 
 
Consider now a standard utilitarian social planner, while keeping the formulation 
presented above. The planner has to find the subsidies that maximize aggregate 
welfare, subject to budget balance and the participation constraint. That can be 
formulated as follows:9 
 
maxm ∑m1M wmm−em
1−am−1
1−am  m ∑s1S s m
s 1−amem1−am−1
1−am
s. t. : em  bm1/am
1bm1/am
wm  m 
∑m1M m  0
4
 
                                                 
9 We assume interior solutions in order to simplify the discusion. Otherwise the first restricion of 
program  4   should be:  em  max e0 , min
bm1/am
1bm1/am
m  m , em .   
 
 
The first order conditions entail: 
 
  wm  m 
− am
1  b1/am−am ∀ m  
(where     stands for the Lagrangean multiplier associated to the budget balance 
restriction). That is, the change in social welfare, due to an increase in the subsidy 
of agent  m,   is inversely proportional to the agent's equilibrium disposable wealth 
(see equation  3 ) and obviously corresponds to the marginal utility of income of 
family  m  . Therefore, in the social optimum we get:  
wm
D am  whD ah , ∀ m,h ∈ M 5  
 
That is, the utilitarian planner generates a distribution of taxes and subsidies that 
equalizes the families' disposable wealth, exponentially weighted by their 
coefficients of risk aversion. 
From this relation it follows that the wealthier the family the smaller the subsidy, 
other things equal, so that the optimal policy typically implies a transfer from rich to 
poor families. Similarly, the higher the concern of the family the larger the subsidy 
(as more concerned families are more willing to invest today into their children's 
future income). Also note that the utilitarian planner gives relatively higher 
subsidies to those families whose children are more productive (i.e. families with a 
better cultural background or with more able children). 
 
Expression  5   can be rewritten in terms of optimal efforts as follows: 
 
em∗ am 1bm  eh
∗ ah 1bh , ∀ m,h ∈ M 6  
so that the utilitarian policy implies equalizing investments across families, scaled 
down bye their corresponding concern parameters, productivity coefficients and 
risk aversion coefficients. 
 
The case of logarithmic utilities ( a  1,   gives us particularly simple expressions 
of equations  5   and  6.   Namely:  
wm
D  whD ∀ m,h ∈ M 5 ′
1
m em
∗  1h eh
∗, ∀ m,h ∈ M 6 ′
 
That is, in this particular case the utilitarian planner generates a distribution of 
taxes and subsidies such that: (i) The disposable wealth becomes equal for all 
families; and (ii) The investment in education, scaled down by the corresponding 
concern parameters, becomes equal for all families. In this particular case the 
policy does not depend on the productivity of the children. 
 
 
3.  Equality of opportunity 
 
Suppose now that the planner aims at implementing an equality of opportunity 
policy, instead of the utilitarian one. Here we have to find the tax/subsidy system 
that equalizes the expected income achieved by those children whose families 
realized a similar degree of effort (where effort corresponds to investment in 
education). In order to analyze this problem we have to specify the different types 
of families and the way of making comparisons among them. Both steps imply a 
number of compromises and simplifications and determine the kind of differences 
the social planner is willing to compensate for. 
 
3.1. The setting 
 
Assume that there is a set  },...,2,1{ Q=Q  different family types, defined by their 
external characteristics, that we associate with their initial wealth and cultural 
background of the parents and the natural ability of their children. That is to say, all 
families of type  q   have the same initial wealth,  wq,   the same parental human 
capital,  Hq,   and children with the same natural abilities  q  . Therefore, all 
children from the families of type  q   exhibit the same productivity coefficients and, 
consequently, identical average productivity,  
q  , for all  q ∈ Q.   Call  Mq   the 
set of families of type  q,   with  ,)(1 MM =∪ = qQq    ∅=′∩ )()( qq MM , for all  q ≠ q ′   in  
Q.
  Let  m,h ∈ Mq   denote two families within the same type. By definition: 
wm  wh  wq
ms  hs , ∀ s
∑
s1
S
sms  ∑
s1
S
shs 
q
 
 
According to this formulation, two families of the same type will choose different 
investments whenever their concern parameters or risk aversion coefficients differ. 
Those are their responsibility features. 
We cannot directly compare investment levels between types because the 
distribution of this kind of effort variable is a type-dependent characteristic. We can 
define the family  m  's degree of investment effort,  emq ,   for  m ∈ Mq,   as a 
function that depends on the investment of family  m   and a representative value of 
the investment within her type. Let  eq   denote such a representative value (e.g. 
the average, the median, or the maximum investment level); then define agent  m  
's degree of investment effort as:  
emq  em
q
eq  
(i.e. the percentage of the representative investment of her type). 
The equality of opportunity principle requires that the children of any two families 
with the same degree of investment effort should achieve the same expected 
income in the second period.10 That is,  
qem  q ′em ′   whenever  
em
eq 
em ′
eq ′ ,   
with  m ∈ Mq,    m ′ ∈ Mq′.   
The following result shows that equality of opportunity amounts to equalizing all 
types' expected income associated with the reference investment level. 
 
• Proposition 2.-  A planner implements the equality of opportunity 
policy if and only if it allocates taxes and subsidies so that  
qeq  q ′eq ′ ∀ q,q ′  1,2, . . . ,Q  
 
Proof.- 
 i   Consider the case of two agents of different types,  m ∈ Mq   and  
m ′ ∈ Mq ′,   that exert the same level of effort; that is,  emq  em ′q
′
.   The individual 
optimality condition  2  implies in that case, 
 
wq  m 
wq ′  m ′

b
m ′
1/a
m ′
1b
m ′
1/a
m ′
eq
bm1/am
1bm1/am
eq ′
7
 
 
The equality of opportunity policy establishes that both agents get the same 
expected human capital. That is, the subsidy policy should be such that:  
q bm
1/am
1  bm1/am
wq  m   q ′ bm ′
1/am ′
1  bm ′
1/am ′
wq ′  m ′  8
 
                                                 
10 When there is uncertainty, equality of opportunity is defined in terms of expected outcomes, 
provided luck is "even handed" across types (see the discussion in Lefranc et al (2007)). This 
amounts to saying that families should not be compensated for the good or bad luck (the realization 
of the random variable that affects the outcomes). 
 
 
Or, put differently, 
wq  m 
wq ′  m ′ 

q ′ bm ′
1/a
m ′
1b
m ′
1/a
m ′
q bm1/am
1bm1/am
8 ′
 
 
Therefore, it follows from  7  and  8 ′ :   
qeq  q ′eq ′ ∀ q,q ′ ∈ Q 9  
 
 
 ii   Suppose now that the planner has arranged the tax/policy scheme so that the 
effort levels induced yield precisely equation  9.   Let us now see that this implies 
equal expected human capital for the children of those families with equal degree 
of effort. If two families exert a comparable degree of effort chosen optimally, we 
have:  
emq
eq 
bm1/am
1bm1/am
wq  m 
eq 
b
m ′
1/a
m ′
1b
m ′
1/a
m ′
wq ′  m ′
eq′ 
em ′
q ′
eq ′  
Multiplying the l.h.s of equation  9  by  
bm
1/am
1bm1/am
wqm
eq   and the r.h.s. by  
b
m ′
1/a
m ′
1b
m ′
1/a
m ′
wq ′m ′
eq ′ ,   we get:  
q bm
1/am
1  bm1/am
wq  m   q ′ bm ′
1/am ′
1  bm ′
1/am ′
wq ′  m ′
 
which is precisely the expected human capital for their children. 
                              Q.e.d. 
 
This Proposition provides us with a precise recipe to implement the equality of 
opportunity policy: equalize the expected human capital associated with the 
reference investment level for all types. Or, put differently, this policy implies 
equalizing all types reference investment levels, weighted by their corresponding 
average productivity (compare with equation  6  . Therefore, those types with 
relatively lower productivity will be induced to invest relatively more. This implies, in 
particular, that the planner compensates for the differences in cultural backgrounds 
and natural abilities across types. 
 
Note that the equilibrium condition  9   can be rewritten as: 
qbm1/amemq wm
D 
q ′bm ′
1/am ′
em ′q
′ wm ′
D ∀ m,m ′ ∈ M 9′
 
That is, the equality of opportunity policy equalizes the families' disposable wealth 
weighted by average productivity, relative investments and the  bm   coefficients. 
 
 
3.2. The equality of opportunity policy 
 
The planner that implements an equality of opportunity policy looks for a system of 
taxes and transfers that solves the following program: 
 
maxm ∑m1M wmm−em
1−am−1
1−am  m ∑s1S s m
s 1−amem1−am−1
1−am
s. t. : em  bm1/am
1bm1/am
wm  m 
∑m1M m  0qeq   ∀ q ∈ Q
10
 
 
Now the planner's program contains three types of restrictions: the participation 
constraint (all agents choose their optimal effort levels), the budget balance 
constraint, and the equality of opportunity constraint. Therefore, the solution to this 
program will typically induce a level of social welfare below that corresponding to 
the pure utilitarian planner, that only involves the first two constraints. One may 
regard that difference as the welfare cost of egalitarianism. The equilibrium 
associated with that tax/subsidy system under equality of opportunity is thus a 
second best solution. Efficiency may fail, in particular, when "rich" families have 
more able children or exhibit a higher concern parameter relative to the "poor" 
ones; in that case transferring one euro from a poor to a rich person may result in a 
higher aggregate income, that can be shared so that both agents get better. 
Trivially, when agents only differ in their initial wealth, the egalitarian solution 
coincides with the utilitarian one and is, therefore, efficient. In that case the 
tax/subsidy scheme is such that it equalizes all agents' disposable wealth and, 
consequently, it brings about an equal expected income. 
The equality of opportunity policy implies transferring wealth to the less favoured 
families, either because they are poorer or have children with lower productivity 
(parents with lower education and/or children with less natural abilities). It also 
implies transferring wealth to those families that exert a higher relative effort. This 
scheme clearly differs from the utilitarian one in which types play no role 
whatsoever and the policy tends to favour the families with more productive 
children (see equation  6  . Under the utilitarian regime, two families with the 
same risk aversion end up with the same disposable wealth, no matter what. Under 
equality of opportunity, two families with the same risk aversion end up with 
different disposable wealth, depending on their children's average productivity and 
their relative investment effort.  
 
The case of logarithmic utilities illustrates well the differences between both 
policies. When  am  1   for all  m ∈ M,   the income distribution that results from a 
utilitarian policy reflects, precisely, the differences in productivity and concern. It 
follows from equations  5 ′  and  6 ′  that:  
EUym   mmK1 , ∀m ∈ M  
 
(where  K1  wmD   is constant and  EUym    stands for the expected income of child  
m   under the utilitarian policy).11 The income distribution derived from the equality 
of opportunity policy reflects the degrees of effort. It follows from equation  9  
that:  
EEopym   emq K2 , ∀ m ∈ M  
(where  K2  qeq   is constant and  EEopym    is the expected income of child  
m   under equality of opportunity). 
 
 
4.  Final comments 
 
We have presented a model in which children's future income depends on their 
natural abilities, the family background, and the investment made by their parents. 
Such an investment is in turn a function of the parents' wealth and education, the 
concern parameter and the coefficient of risk aversion. The public authority affects 
family decisions through a simple policy variable (money transfers). The model 
shows that the investment of families in human capital for their children depends 
positively on the initial wealth, the concern parameter and the subsidy. In 
                                                 
11 In the general case we have:  EUym   m bmK0 1/am   with  K0  1/ wm
D am .   
 
 
particular, higher subsidies imply higher investment levels due to the reduction in 
the opportunity cost of education they induce. The relationship between investment 
in the children's education and their productivity depends on the elasticity of 
marginal income (or, alternatively, the coefficient of relative risk aversion). The 
case of logarithmic utilities is specially simple because it neutralizes the effect of 
average productivity on the investment decisions. The relation between optimal 
investment and risk aversion is positive, provided the marginal utility of income is 
elastic. 
We have considered two different tax/subsidy schemes, depending on the nature 
of the social planner. The maximization of social welfare for a utilitarian planner 
entails a series of money transfers that compensate the differences in the agents' 
initial wealth, taking into account their risk aversion coefficients. This policy benefits 
those families with more productive children. The planner who cares for equality of 
opportunity compensates not only for the differences in initial wealth but also for 
the differences in natural abilities, parental cultural background, and relative 
investment efforts. As a consequence, the income distribution that results from a 
utilitarian policy reflects the family differences in productivity, concern and risk 
aversion, whereas the income distribution derived from the equality of opportunity 
policy reflects the degrees of investment efforts. 
The model contemplates three variables related to opportunity: the wealth and 
education of the parents, on the one hand, and the children's natural abilities, on 
the other hand. One can also consider further opportunity variables (race, gender, 
etc.) Introducing those external circumstances would affect the model by modifying 
the generation of types, which implies altering the schedule of relative investments 
and, consequently, the allocation of subsidies. The model makes it clear the key 
role of the choice of the reference variable that is used to compare degrees of 
effort between the types (Proposition 3 shows that those reference variables 
actually define the equality of opportunity condition). 
The concern parameter and the coefficient of risk aversion are the variables related 
to responsibility in this model. One may argue that this approach implies making 
grown up children responsible for the attitudes of their parents, which might be 
unfair. Yet this is partly an interpretation issue. Our model is very simple and small 
children in the first period blow up to adults in the second one. Yet, children grow 
and assume responsibilities on their future progressively so that the concern 
coefficient may be regarded as incorporating the share of the child's responsibility 
in its own education (think of the case of deciding about engaging university 
studies). And the same happens with the risk aversion coefficient, that is to be 
interpreted as the whole family's attitude towards the risk, that includes the child's 
preferences.12 
                                                 
12 A more natural approach would be to add an intermediate period to the model in which children 
start making decisions on their own future as a function of their parents former and present 
investment and their preferences. In that context one may discuss some other aspects of the 
problem, such as the the role of early education in the configuration of non-cognitive skills, the role 
of schools, or the interplay between altruistic parents, egotistic children and policy variables. The 
meaning and implications of the egalitarian policy in this context is much less obvious. That is a 
relevant topic that is left for future research. 
 
Neither the utilitarian planner nor the planner who cares for equality of opportunity 
compensate agents for luck. Equality of outcomes, conditional on comparable 
degrees of investment, is formulated in expected terms so that the particular 
realization of the random variable is not considered ethically relevant. This 
corresponds implicitly to the case in which luck is even-handed across types and 
makes sense in a static model. The case in which luck is type-dependent may call 
for a reformulation of the model (e.g. weighting expected incomes by the standard 
deviations within types). This reformulation is inevitably much deeper when effort is 
not observable and we consider a dynamic context with repeated interactions 
between the planner and the agents (see Calo-Blanco (2008)). 
 
Finally, observe that the formal decision model developed here is one in which 
agents make costly investments in order to achieve future rewards. It might thus be 
applicable to very different scenarios in which equality of opportunity matters. As 
an example we can think of the case of a Federal State in which the agents are the 
states, effort refers to share of the GDP invested in R&D, and the outcomes 
correspond to the regional per capita GDP or growth rates. The model would help 
to analyze the transfer policy that would implement the equality of opportunity 
principle in this context.13 
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